(In Progress)
My dissertation attempts to characterize, provide the grounds of, and explain the ways in which certain beings matter morally. Although mattering morally is often captured with the concept of moral status, my analysis is framed primarily in terms of value. One finding is that this value is best characterized as essential value: the value a being has in virtue of its essential properties. Pursuing this approach, I develop an account of the value of human beings that is based on an account of our human essence. I then expand this framework to consider the value of other beings, arguing that while all material beings have non-instrumental essential value, there are different degrees and kinds of this value, grounded in differences between the essences of different kinds of beings.
Independent papers in progress stemming from my dissertation work:
I argue that the value of humanity must be a non-instrumental essential value; that is, a value grounded by our essence. As I show, this is because we are of value in our own right, not merely due to our instantiating certain states or capacities, nor due to our relations to other individuals. This renders most existent accounts of our value either incorrect or crucially incomplete. It also implies, perhaps surprisingly, that accounts of our value as human beings and accounts of our essence as human beings must be mutually supporting.
There is increasing debate over whether our value is best understood as non-relational or as relational. This debate concerns the character of our value, not its grounds. I argue that understanding our value as relational has a distinct advantage: it avoids a radical form of inegalitarianism, in which our value is increased by achieving valuable states or successfully exercising valuable capacities. Such inegalitarianism is implied by non-relational understandings of our value, I argue. But relational value avoids this by making the value of capacities and their exercise reciprocal.
I argue that well-being is best understood as essential attributive goodness: being a good instance of the kind of being one is essentially. This contrasts with most second order accounts of well-being, which construe well-being either as a variety of good-for or as good simpliciter. I argue that both of these understandings yield implausible accounts of well-being’s normativity as well as its range of applicability. Construing well-being as essential attributive goodness, on the other hand, is more plausible on both counts.
I contest the common belief that consciousness is required for moral standing, arguing that plants, and perhaps other insentient beings, do have moral standing. I support this position with an error theory about why consciousness seems like a plausible requirement for moral standing, as well as an analysis of the proper object of our moral concern for others. I end by discussing the practical ramifications of this unusual view, particularly regarding plants and natural collective entities such as ecosystems.
Other research interests:
While my dissertation work concerns the nature of being and the value of beings, another research interest concerns the nature of agency and normativity (both epistemic and practical). The core of this is what I call the “suprarational”: beliefs and commitments that are prerequisite for rational thought, and which therefore are not rational (i.e., justified by reason), but which are fitting. I suspect that such suprarational beliefs and commitments can successfully counter many forms of epistemic and practical skepticism. I also suspect that they form the basis of both epistemic and practical norms, as well as human agency, and can shed light on a variety of other issues, too, ranging from the irrationality of conspiracy theories to the nature of love (and hate). Although this research interest has been on the back burner since beginning my dissertation, it is systematically connected to my dissertation and I hope to return to it in the near future.