I argue that the value of persons must be a non-instrumental essential value; that is, a value grounded by our essence. As I show, this is required by the fact that we persons are of value in our own right, not merely in virtue of our relation to certain states, capacities, nor other persons. This undermines most existent accounts of the grounds of our value. It also implies, surprisingly, that any account of our value must be supported by an account of our identity.

I argue that well-being is best understood as essential attributive goodness: being a good instance of the kind of being one is essentially. This contrasts with most second order accounts of well-being, which construe well-being either as a type of good-for or as good simpliciter. But I argue that both of these construals yield implausible accounts of well-being’s normativity as well as its range of applicability. Understanding well-being as essential attributive goodness is more plausible on both counts.

I contest the common belief that consciousness is required for moral standing, arguing that plants, and perhaps other insentient beings, do have moral standing. I support this position with an error theory about why consciousness seems like a plausible requirement for moral standing, as well as an analysis of the proper object of our moral concern for others. I end by discussing the practical ramifications of this unusual view, particularly regarding plants and natural collective entities such as ecosystems.

I show that artifacts are essentially instrumental: their essence is to further the ends of human beings. This means fitting treatment of artifacts consists in using them for human ends, even if doing so destroys them. I argue the same is true of human engineered species (e.g., most farm animals) since they are partly artifactual in virtue of being engineered. But these species are not entirely artifactual, and so they must also be treated in ways that fit their non-artifactual natures.