RESEARCH

Dissertation: The Value of Beings

(In Progress)

My dissertation attempts to characterize, provide the grounds of, and explain the ways in which certain beings matter morally. Although mattering morally is often captured with the concept of moral status, my analysis is framed primarily in terms of value. One finding is that this value is best characterized as essential value: the value a being has in virtue of its essential properties. Pursuing this approach, I develop an account of the value of human beings that is based on an account of our human essence. I then expand this framework to consider the value of other beings, arguing that while all material beings have non-instrumental essential value, there are different degrees and types of this value, grounded in differences between the essences of different types of beings. 

Independent papers in progress stemming from my dissertation work:

The Essential Value of Persons

I argue that the value of persons must be a non-instrumental essential value; that is, a value grounded by our essence. As I show, this is required by the fact that we persons are of value in our own right, not merely in virtue of our relation to certain states, capacities, nor other persons. This undermines most existent accounts of the grounds of our value. It also implies, surprisingly, that any account of our value must be supported by an account of our identity.

Well-being as Essential Attributive Goodness

I argue that well-being is best understood as essential attributive goodness: being a good instance of the kind of being one is essentially. This contrasts with most second order accounts of well-being, which construe well-being either as a type of good-for or as good simpliciter. But I argue that both of these construals yield implausible accounts of well-being’s normativity as well as its range of applicability. Understanding well-being as essential attributive goodness is more plausible on both counts.

A Case for the Moral Standing of Insentient Beings

I contest the common belief that consciousness is required for moral standing, arguing that plants, and perhaps other insentient beings, do have moral standing. I support this position with an error theory about why consciousness seems like a plausible requirement for moral standing, as well as an analysis of the proper object of our moral concern for others. I end by discussing the practical ramifications of this unusual view, particularly regarding plants and natural collective entities such as ecosystems.

Essential Instrumentality and the Moral Status of Artifacts and Human Engineered Species

I show that artifacts are essentially instrumental: their essence is to further the ends of human beings. This means fitting treatment of artifacts consists in using them for human ends, even if doing so destroys them. I argue the same is true of human engineered species (e.g., most farm animals) since they are partly artifactual in virtue of being engineered. But these species are not entirely artifactual, and so they must also be treated in ways that fit their non-artifactual natures.

Other research interests:

The Suprarational

While my dissertation work concerns the nature of being and the value of beings, another research interest concerns the nature of agency and of normativity (both epistemic and practical). The core of this is what I call the “suprarational”: beliefs and commitments that are prerequisite for rational thought, and which therefore are not rational (i.e., justified by reason), but which are fitting. I suspect that such suprarational beliefs and commitments can successfully counter many forms of epistemic and practical skepticism. I also suspect that they form the basis of both epistemic and practical norms, as well as human agency, and can shed light on a variety of other issues, too, ranging from the irrationality of conspiracy theories to the nature of love (and hate). Although this research interest has been on the back burner since beginning my dissertation, it is systematically connected to my dissertation and I hope to return to it in the near future.